The Maze: Amazon’s brand map suggests a sprawling portfolio. Its FY2025 accounts show where the money actually comes from: online stores generated $269.3 billion, or 37.6% of net sales. Third-party seller services, AWS and advertising together generated $369.5 billion, or 51.5%. The storefront is the largest single line; three other engines collectively matter more.
That distinction starts with the accounting. Amazon reports three segments: North America, International and AWS. Its seven net-sales categories cut across those segments. Online stores and physical stores generated $291.8 billion combined, 40.7% of sales. “Online stores” includes products sold in Amazon stores and digital content, while physical stores includes sales from stores such as Whole Foods Market. Amazon says digitally ordered items picked up in stores remain online-store sales. A familiar retail map can hide those classifications.
Online stores remain the biggest single category, but not a majority. The $269.3 billion line grew 9% year over year. Physical stores added $22.6 billion, up 6%. Together the two store categories produced 40.7% of sales. The online-store label is not a pure measure of first-party merchandise: Amazon’s definition includes digital content and certain shipping-related activity, and pickup classification follows the ordering channel.
Seller services monetize the marketplace without counting its gross merchandise volume as Amazon revenue. The $172.2 billion category includes commissions, fulfillment and shipping fees, and other seller services. It is net revenue, not the full value of goods sold by third parties. Advertising contributed $68.6 billion and grew 22%; subscriptions added $49.6 billion. These lines capture several ways Amazon earns from the activity around a purchase, but the filing does not isolate operating profit for seller services or advertising.
AWS is smaller than the store line and much larger in disclosed operating income. AWS produced $128.7 billion, 18.0% of net sales, and grew 20%. It generated $45.6 billion of operating income, about 57% of Amazon’s $80.0 billion total across its three reported segments. That comparison is possible because AWS is itself a reportable segment. Amazon does not disclose comparable operating income for advertising or third-party seller services, so their revenue cannot be translated into a like-for-like profit ranking.
The original visual’s wheel is a useful breadth cue, not a financial measure. Its labels mix brands, services, acquired companies and business areas, with no common unit, date or inclusion rule. The 10-K provides a disciplined alternative: seven revenue categories with a defined period and accounting basis. Still, category shares are not segment shares, and revenue share is not profit share. Amazon’s three reporting segments group several categories together, so a category chart cannot be read as an organization chart or a causal flywheel.
Why it matters: Marketplace operators, retailers and advertisers should ask which customer pays for each layer and what cost sits behind it. Seller fees, cloud workloads, memberships and ads can all grow alongside retail, but the public filing does not show that one automatically causes the next. The mix makes Amazon’s reach measurable; it does not prove every brand in a logo wheel is strategically connected.
